

Trusting Government: An Investigation

Jordan Barth
Department of Government, School of Public Affairs
American University
4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016

Faculty Advisor: Dr. Jan Leighley

Abstract

It is critical for citizens to trust government processes and the officials who carry out the processes for our political system to function properly. This paper seeks to investigate whether specific demographic factors play a role in one's decision to trust government while making a strong methodological contribution to previous political trust literature. While previous scholars have used time-series analysis or dyad ratios with public opinion polls, this author utilizes the 2012 American National Election Survey (ANES) and comes to different conclusions. Previous literature shows that race, level of education and income play an important role in the development of one's ideology and their policy preferences. It should follow that they play a similarly large role in determining respondents' trust in government. Performing tabular and probabilistic analysis using 2012 ANES data, this paper's findings run contrary to those of previous works. The results obtained shed new light on previous studies and can be used by politicians and pundits alike to gain the public's trust in government.

Keywords: trust, government, polarization

1. Introduction

"Trust matters"¹. Most researchers today focus on "political distrust," which "has defined [the] American political landscape over the last several decades"². "As we trust each other less, we no longer believe that our opponents speak with legitimacy; and our politics and social relations become wrestling matches"³. Congress is becoming increasingly polarized by the day. Congressional productivity is at record lows⁴. "As our language has become more coarse, the ideological distance between Republicans has increased, and our leaders have found it difficult to reach agreement on even routine legislation"⁵. As a result, the public has lost confidence in the political system. "Identifiers with each party now see the other party as threats to their own cultures"⁶. With members of Congress seeing their colleagues as "threats," increased ideological distance between members, and congressional productivity at record lows, it should serve as no surprise why the public dislikes and distrusts government.

Why is citizen trust in government so important? Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn believe that "citizen trust in government is necessary for political leaders to make binding decisions, commit resources to attain societal goals and secure citizen compliance without coercion"⁷. Power requires the will of the people. Today, anyone reading a magazine article, watching cable news, or following social media feeds can develop a distrust of government. Is distrust of government becoming the new norm or is it simply reporting in the 24-hour news cycle? It is on the basis of this inquiry that the question this paper seeks to answer was formed: does a citizenry's race, level of education or income play a role in their trust of government?

2. Literature Review

2.1 Defining Political Trust

According to Hetherington, political trust is the “degree to which people perceive that government is producing outcomes consistent with their expectations”⁸. Political trust is “comprised primarily of evaluations of public officials, institutions, and satisfaction with policy outcomes and outputs”⁹. It is driven by five factors¹⁰: public perception of effective linkages between citizens and representatives; trust in officials possessing the “requisite competence, skill, intelligence, expertise and experience” to govern; public perception of decision makers having high moral and ethical standards; public perception of fairness in the decision-making process; the creation of legislative outputs that address and resolve major societal problems; and public perception of fair policy outcomes.

Political trust helps to create consensus in the mass public by “providing a bridge between the governing party’s policy ideas and the opposition’s”¹¹. Policymakers usually respond to public wishes when consensus develops¹². However, “consensus requires significant buy-in from independents and partisans of the opposite party. They are the most willing to make the ideological sacrifice necessary” for consensus to develop¹³; those who distrust government are less willing or even unwilling to make “ideological sacrifices”.

The consequences for low political trust in society are steep. Low political trust undermines presidential approval, increases voter support for non-incumbent and third party candidates, and elite challenging initiatives such as term limits¹⁴. Citizens with low political trust are more likely to support initiatives that remove power from the federal government and hand it over to state and local authorities to decide social issues¹⁵.

However, not all political trust scholars feel that low political trust or distrust is necessarily harmful. First, distrust can develop and maintain political organizations¹⁶. Public distrust can provide a niche for groups to be built or altered. Second, distrust can influence citizens voting decisions. With congressional approval ratings at record low, opposing candidates for Congress frequently speak ill of the institution) with the hopes of tapping into the public distrust and gaining constituent trust¹⁷. As a result, voters often reject the majority party. Finally, distrust can legitimize or delegitimize policies. Elite manipulation of an opponent’s policy is a way of decreasing support for an adversary’s goals and legitimizing one’s own policy goals¹⁸.

2.2 What Influences Political Trust?

2.2.1. *performance*

Scholars have found that performance is one of the biggest factors in determining citizen political trust¹⁹. “Trust is a reflection of government performance”²⁰. Describing government performance relating to political trust has involved public evaluations of the President and Congress. Citrin and Luks found that presidential and congressional approval is associated with generalized feelings of political trust²¹. Hetherington found that an individuals’ degree of trust in government affects their evaluations of the President and Congress²². In addition, greater support for the President yields “greater support for government action regardless of the party affiliation of the president”²³.

However, the biggest piece of government performance as it relates to political trust is economic performance²⁴. Keele notes that economic performance over the short-term and the long term can impact political trust²⁵. Negative perceptions of economic health promote greater political distrust. Uslander found that the economy’s strength is directly related to political trust in his study of economic health and political trust²⁶. Since one of government’s main roles is to keep the economy strong and citizens rely on a strong economy to maintain strong financial health, such a finding should be expected.

2.2.2. *process*

Americans possess a deep misunderstanding of their political system. The public wants democracy to be “visible and accountable on those rare occasions when they are motivated to be involved”²⁷. Yet, citizens want government to be responsive to their needs; legislative responsiveness to citizen preferences is responsible for increased political trust²⁸. Citizens take into account similarities in policy preferences between themselves and those who represent them²⁹. Many want the opportunity to be involved even though they probably have no intention of ever participating³⁰. Although Americans like democracy in theory, they hate it in practice because of partisan disagreement inherent in the

policymaking process³¹. Public exposure to legislative conflict decreases congressional approval³² and congressional approval moves political trust³³.

Hibbing and Theiss-Morse note that “people think about process in relatively simple terms”³⁴. The public “tends to think that members of Congress typically play ordinary Americans for suckers by abusing legislative perquisites while ignoring what is best for the country as a whole”³⁵. As a result, the public is often willing to take power away from the federal government. Citizens seem to forget or not realize that partisan conflict is part of policymaking³⁶. The public does not like bickering government.

2.2.3. priming

Perceptions of incivility in public life and the rise of new media have contributed to a sharp decrease in political trust. As a result, “across America and increasingly around the world, from campuses to the halls of Congress, social and political life seem dominated today by incivility. . . . No one seems to question the premise that political debate has become too extreme, too confrontational, too coarse”³⁷. Citizens decide how much they trust government based partially on which issues they think are important at a given time³⁸. Effects of political trust on policy preferences are strongly conditioned by what people are primed to think about prior to forming their trust judgment. Hetherington and Husser imply that the effects of political trust are influenced by the amount of time spent by media outlets on a particular issue³⁹. This is the case with television. Television tends to drive down political trust among the citizenry as a result of the fodder that is broadcast on a daily basis⁴⁰.

Greater public cynicism decreases political trust. Cappella and Jamieson point to media reports that highlight “conflict in politics as a source of greater political cynicism”⁴¹. Patterson blames the negative political coverage for the public’s cynicism towards government⁴². He suggests that “negative commentary from journalists naturally leads members of the public to think ill of politicians and the system in which they are embedded”⁴³.

2.2.4. polarization

Polarization is defined by Hetherington and Rudolph as “movement by party elites to the ideological poles”⁴⁴, characterized by “raw negative feelings towards members of the opposite party”⁴⁵. Iyengar blames the increasing polarization on the rhetoric used during political campaigns⁴⁶. The recent emergence of cable news networks and rising influence partisan websites allows people to live inside information bubbles. “Americans are increasingly turning away from traditional news sources in favor of more ideological ones. . . to get a heavy dose of all that is wrong with their political opponents”⁴⁷. Political talk shows “are purposefully presented in an uncivil manner that violates social norms and, as a consequence, sharpens feelings”⁴⁸. “Low and polarized trust explains why a moderate mass public puts up with, even seems to embrace, staunchly ideological leaders”⁴⁹.

Polarization decreases political trust and social capital. Increased social capital is associated with increased political trust⁵⁰. Partisan conflict reigns during polarized government. The “ideological gap makes it more difficult to find common ground on issues of policy”⁵¹. Polarized governments produce more legislative gridlock and fewer important laws⁵². Members of the public become disenfranchised with the political process when exposed to legislative conflict⁵³. Uslander found that “increase in legislative polarization tracks the decline in political trust”⁵⁴. In addition, the increase in social polarization tracks the decline in political trust⁵⁵. Polarized politics makes people less trusting. Polarization creates uglier and more contentious processes.

2.2.5. education

Education enables citizens to possess a more informed judgment on government. Poorly informed citizens, “hold fewer, less stable, and less consistent opinions. They are more susceptible to political propaganda and less receptive to relevant new information”⁵⁶. Putnam found that highly educated Americans are more trusting than lower educated⁵⁷. Americans with higher levels of education are more likely to stay informed on the political environment because they have more time to devote to understanding the issues at hand. Since more educated citizens take a greater role in civic life; their decisions oftentimes influence others’ trust in government⁵⁸.

Putnam details the effects of education on child development⁵⁹. His research has implications to political trust, describing how critical early life experiences are in developing child’s social values, which serve as the backbone for one’s political beliefs. A child’s upbringing and education lays the groundwork for their political beliefs and their trust in government as adults “Kids from less educated homes are less knowledgeable about and interested in politics; less

likely to trust government; less likely to be involved in local civic affairs”⁶⁰. Putnam illustrates that political trust can be developed at all stages of an individual’s life.

2.2.6. *income*

The strength of the economy and its impact of citizens’ income is vital to the measure of political trust. Levels of political trust rise and fall with the associated changes in income⁶¹. Income of African-Americans has a negative relationship with trust in government. As income increases, trust decreases for the demographic. For whites, income has the opposite effect. As income decreases, political trust decreases. Those with lower incomes are increasingly familiar with the shortcomings involved with government-provided services as they are more likely to be reliant on these services⁶².

Putnam notes that wealthy youth are more confident that they can influence government while the poor are less likely to try⁶³. Political trust theorists have believed that income and individual experiences related to economic performance meant little regarding political trust. That belief has since been disproven. Economic hardship, closely related to income for the purpose of this analysis, lead people to be less generous in their understanding of others negatively impacting political trust⁶⁴.

Uslaner and Brown found that income inequality was a strong predictor of trust⁶⁵. Wealthier, more educated people take a greater role in civic life and can oftentimes influence others’ trust in government. They are more likely to stay informed on political issues. Economic inequality has an adverse effect on economic growth, shown through the impact it has on political institutions. When citizens are not getting the services they need due to funding constraints, political trust decreases. Wroe finds that “Americans who perceive themselves as economically insecure have lower levels of political trust than their more secure peers”⁶⁶. Insecurity “at least matches, and by some measures trumps”⁶⁷ evaluations of the macro economy’s future and party identification in political trust judgments.

2.2.7. *race/ethnicity*

Race “governs the way that people engage(d) in social, political, and economic conflict”⁶⁸. Research shows that African-Americans trust government less than whites⁶⁹. Political trust is shaped among African-Americans by age, southern residence, social class, gender, marriage, interpersonal trust and political ideology⁷⁰. Avery argues that “lower levels of political trust among African Americans represent a greater unhappiness with the political system rather than specific dissatisfaction with the current political regime and its policies”⁷¹. “Mistrust among African-Americans is associated with greater participation in protests, often motivated by want for substantial change”⁷².

While education has a positive impact on white Americans in their measures of political trust, Mangum and Avery suggest that education has a negative effect on the political trust of African-Americans⁷³. Higher educated African-Americans are less trusting than lower educated African-Americans⁷⁴. Higher educated African-Americans are more likely to understand of the means government can use to help minorities, more aware of the political system, and government’s history of mistreatment and exploitation of minorities. For African-Americans, “trust is reflective of a deep malaise with the political system reflecting decades of political exclusion and violence”⁷⁵. He also finds that those with deeper social networks and higher levels of social capital are more likely to trust government. African-Americans show a higher level of trust among other African-Americans compared to that shown by Whites⁷⁶. Based on a review of the literature, the author suggests the following hypotheses.

2.2.8. *hypotheses*

Hypothesis 1: Respondents with a High school education or less are less likely to trust government than respondents with a college degree or higher.

Hypothesis 2: Respondents with high income are less likely to trust government than respondents with low income.

Hypothesis 3: Controlling for education, respondents who identify themselves as “black” are less likely to trust government than whites.

3. Methodology

3.1. Data And Hypothesis Selection

Survey data was collected by researchers at Stanford University and the University of Michigan as part of the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES), edited for Pollock's "A STATA Companion to Political Analysis." This data is part of a collection of national surveys fielded, funded by the U.S. government since 1948. The election studies present data on Americans' social backgrounds, social and political values, perceptions and evaluations of groups, opinions on public policy, and participation in political life. The ANES 2012 consisted of a cross-section of respondents that yielded 5,916 interviews. The samples for the face-to-face and the internet modes were drawn independently from the U.S. population of adults aged 18 and over who were eligible to vote.

Many political trust scholars have examined the relationship among race, level of education, income and a respondent's trust in government. This paper differs from previous studies in the selection of data set. Those who have looked at the relationships prior to this paper have used ANES time-series data to perform time-series analysis or polling data to perform analysis using dyad ratios. For a study to possess sound methodology, it must be able to be replicated while achieving the same results. The author performs a variation of this concept by using a common data set in political science and attempt to replicate the results. The ANES 2012 data set has many methodological similarities with those previously used to analyze this question.

3.2. Variables

Political trust (trust in government) serves as my dependent variable. Surveyors asked half of the respondents before the 2012 election, "how often do you trust government to do what is right?" They repeated the question post-election to a different set of respondents to compare. The author has combined pre- and post-election responses to increase the sample size, improving the accuracy of results. There are 5,876 cases of the dependent variable available for analysis. The dependent variable was coded with four response categories, down from five in the revised variable. 346 respondents who answered with "never" were coded as '1'. 4,563 respondents who answered "some of the time" or "about half of the time" were coded as '2'. 876 respondents who answered "most of the time" were coded as '3'. 90 respondents who answered "always" or "just about always" were coded as '4'. Forty respondents did not provide their level of trust in government when asked.

The variable education is a three-category response variable. Respondents answered as having a "high school diploma or less", "some college", or "more than a Bachelor's degree". The variable had 5,866 cases. There were approximately 2,383 respondents with a high school education or less (1), 1,778 respondents with "some college" (2), and 1,725 respondents with a college degree or higher (3). Fifty respondents did not provide their level of education when asked by the questioner. The author uses education as a control and independent variable. Controlling for education was important for my analysis due to the disparity in education between respondents who identify themselves as "black" and those who identify themselves as "white".

The variable has 5,887 reported cases. There were 3,495 respondents who answered "White non-Hispanic" and coded as 1; 1,016 respondents identified themselves as "Black non-Hispanic" (2); 1,007 respondents identified themselves as "Hispanic" (3); and 369 respondents identified themselves as "Other non-Hispanic" (4). Twenty-nine respondents did not identify their race/ethnicity to the questioner.

The classes for income, based off 2012 Census data, are "sub-poverty", "poverty", "lower middle class", "middle class", "upper middle class", and "top 5%". 1,486 respondents with incomes of under \$5,000 to \$24,999 were coded as "sub-poverty" (1). 303 respondents with incomes from \$25,000 to \$29,999 were coded as "poverty" (2). 1517 respondents with incomes from \$30,000 to \$59,999 were coded as "lower middle class" (3). 1,321 respondents in the "middle class" were coded as those who reported incomes of \$60,000 to \$99,999 (4). 668 "upper middle class" respondents reported incomes of \$100,000 to \$149,999 (5). 421 respondents "top 5%" were coded as respondents who reported incomes of \$150,000 and above (6). 199 respondents did not provide their income.

4. Analysis

4.1. Hypothesis 1

Table 1: Respondent's political trust (by level of education)

Level of Trust	HS or Less	Some College	College +
Never	7.20%	6.64%	3.43%
Some of the time	75.61%	76.85%	81.09%
Most of the time	14.68%	15.33%	14.96%
Always/Just about always	2.52%	1.18%	.52%
Chi ² = 58.166			
P-value= 0.00 (P<.05)			

The first hypothesis investigates the relationship between a respondent's level of education and their trust in government. The author found a high probability of an existing relationship between the variables (see Table 1). A value less than .05 (95 percent confidence interval) listed in parentheses indicates that percentages shown in the table are significant. As seen in Table 1, regardless of education, respondents were most likely to trust government only "some of the time". Respondents with a college degree or higher are more likely to trust government "some of the time." 81.09% of college degree or above respondents said they trust government "some of the time" compared to 75.61% of high school diploma or less respondents. More respondents with a high school diploma or less "never" trust government compared to respondents with a college degree or higher.

However, Table (1) also shows that respondents with a high school education or less "always" or "just about always" trust government more than those with a college degree or higher. Based on my results, I am unable to form a conclusion. One explanation for my results could be that the more informed a respondent is, the more leery they are of government. In other words, the more education one has, the more likely they respond "some of the time."

Table 2: Respondent's Trust In Government (By Level Of Income)

Level of Trust	Sub-Poverty	Poverty	Lower Middle Class	Middle Class	Upper Middle Class	Top 5%
Never	8.11%	5.16%	6.46%	5.44%	2.29%	3.25%
Some/Half of the time	72.07%	75.09%	78.91%	79.21%	82.33%	80.58%
Most of the time	16.64%	18.90%	13.49%	14.28%	14.21%	16.07%
Always/Just about always	3.19%	.85%	1.14%	1.1%	1.17%	.11%
Chi ² = 89.5883						
P= 0.00 (P<.05)						

4.2. Hypothesis 2

The second hypothesis analyzes the relationship between a respondent's income and their trust in government. Similar to my previous hypothesis, the results lead to inconclusive findings. In addition, the author found a high probability of an existing relationship between the variables. Regardless of income, respondents are most likely to trust government "some of the time." As shown in Table 2, more respondents in "sub-poverty" (8.11%) and "poverty" (5.16%) never trust government than "upper middle class" (2.29%) and "top 5%" (3.25%) respondents. More "sub-poverty" respondents (16.64%) and "poverty" (18.9%) trust government "most of the time" compared to "upper middle class" respondents (14.21%) and "top 5%" respondents (16.07%).

However, tabular analysis also shows that more respondents in the "upper middle class" (82.33%) and "top 5%" (80.58%) trust government "some of the time" than respondents in "sub-poverty" (72.02%) and "poverty" (75.09%). The author is unable to determine whether high income respondents are more likely to trust than low income. One explanation for this result could be that the more wealthy a respondent is, the more leery they are of government.

4.3. Hypothesis 3

Table 3: Respondents possessing a high school diploma or less trust in government (by race)

Level of Trust	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Total
Never	6.02%	3.76%	4.14%	11.93%	5.90%
Some/Half of the time	81.16%	69.19%	67.82%	70.85%	77.63%
Most of the time	12.12%	22.82%	24.39%	14.86%	14.92%
Always/Just about always	0.69%	4.23%	3.65%	2.35%	1.54%
Chi ² = 110.4113					
P= 0.00 (P<.05)					

The third and final hypothesis posits that when controlling for education, “black” respondents are less likely to trust government than “white” respondents. For this hypothesis to pass scrutiny, “black” respondents must trust government more than “white” respondents at all levels of education. Immediately, the hypothesis is rejected. Respondents with education of a high school diploma or less, 6% of White respondents never trust government compared to 3.76% of “black” respondents. As shown in Table 3 above, 81.16% of respondents who identify as “white” overwhelmingly trust government “some/half of the time” compared to 69.19% of respondents who identify as “black.” Almost twice as many respondents who identify as “black” (22.82%) or “hispanic” trust government “most of the time” as respondents who identify as “white” (12.12%). More respondents who identify as “black” (4.23%) “always” trust government than those who identify as “white” (.69%). My analysis leads me to conclude that respondents with a high school diploma or less who identify as “black” or less are more likely to trust government than “white” respondents.

Table 4: Respondents who possess some college trust in government (by race)

Level of Trust	White	Black	Hispanic	Other
Never	6.59%	5.21%	3.59%	17.61%
Some/Half of the time	79.70%	69.39%	70.53%	67.30%
Most of the time	12.95%	23.24%	24.05%	12.03%
Always/Just about always	0.76%	2.17%	1.83%	3.06%
Chi ² = 63.5490				
P= 0.00 (P<.05)				

The next aspect of my hypothesis requires that I investigate whether “black” respondents with some college trust government less than “white” respondents. A high chi² statistic and a low p-value demonstrates that a relationship between race and trust in government exists. As shown in Table 4, fewer “black respondents” “never” trust government in relation to “white” respondents”. In support of my original hypothesis, the author found that more “white” respondents (79.7%) trust government “some of the time” than “black” respondents (69.39%). However, the author also found that more “black” respondents (23.24%) trust govt “most of the time” than “white” respondents (12.95%). In addition, more “black” respondents (2.17%) always trust govt in relation to “white” respondents (.76%). Tabular analysis shows that respondents with some college who identify as “black” trust government less than respondents who identify as “white”.

Table 5: Respondents who possess a college degree or higher trust in government (by race)

Level of Trust	White	Black	Hispanic	Other
Never	3.73%	1.78%	2.33%	2.17%
Some/Half of the time	83.32%	74.95%	65.71%	76.84%
Most of the time	12.74%	20.46%	31.27%	19.55%
Always/Just about always	0.21%	2.81%	0.69%	1.44%
Chi ² = 55.379				
P= 0.00 (P<.05)				

The final part of my hypothesis requires that the author investigates whether “black” respondents with a college degree or higher trust government less than “white” respondents. As shown in Table 5 above, similar to respondents with

some college education, fewer “black” respondents (1.78%) “never” trust government in relation to “white” respondents (3.7%). I found that a strong majority of “white” respondents (83.32%) trust government “some of the time” in relation to 74.95% of “black” respondents. In contradiction to my hypothesis, the author found that more “black” respondents (20.46%) trust govt “most of the time” than “white” respondents (12.74%). Finally, more “black” respondents (2.81%) “always” trust govt in relation to “white” respondents (.21%). Respondents with a college degree or higher who identify as “black” trust government less than “white” respondents. Tabular analysis has demonstrated that when controlling for education, “black” respondents are *more* likely to trust government than “white” respondents.

5. Conclusion

Unfortunately, my research has some severe limitations. Most notably, my results were not consistent with findings of previous literature. In studying political trust, time-series data from the 1960’s to present day is oftentimes used to analyze the variable. The author used data from one ANES cycle to display the relationship under the assumption that data from one ANES cycle was sufficient to prove the relationship between trust in government and my demographic factors. It should also be noted that my findings should not be generalized to fit respondents who classify themselves as “Asian”, “Hispanic”, or “other”. This could be done through the work of future research.

There are countless avenues for one to use my research as a starting point. As mentioned previously, using aggregate data from multiple years of the ANES may have helped to shed light on my hypotheses. Future research could use aggregate data to illustrate the relevance of the demographic factors used by the author in relation to one’s trust in government. Other demographic factors could be used to analyze respondents’ trust in government. For example: age or sex could be used as independent variable to see if there is any relationship with trust in government. Future research could include a comparative analysis of a western European state to show contrast. In the analysis, the researcher could use country-specific data to compare against the United States.

My findings and the literature further solidify the importance of political trust among Americans. My research is unique in the methodology I used to show a relationship between trust and government and demographic factors. Increasing political trust will not happen over night nor will it occur with quick solutions. My research and that of other political trust scholars, if utilized by elected officials, will help to narrow deep divisions in our nation’s politics and restore trust in government.

6. Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Vice Provost for Undergraduate Education Jessica Waters, Professors Saul Newman, Nikki Souris, Jeremy Janow, Elizabeth Sherman, and Kimberly Cowell-Meyers for their feedback. The author wishes to especially thank Dr. Jan Leighley and Dr. Karen O’Connor for their patience, guidance, and support during the research process.

7. References

- 1 Marc J. Hetherington, *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005), 1.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Eric M. Uslaner, “Producing and Consuming Trust,” *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (2000): 584.
- 4 Sarah A. Binder, *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
- 5 Eric M. Uslaner, “Congressional Polarization and Political Trust,” *The Forum* 13 (2015): 362.
- 6 Ibid., 363.
- 7 Virginia A. Chanley, Thomas J. Rudolph and Wendy M. Rahn, “The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in Government: A Time Series Analysis,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 64 (2000): 239-240.
- 8 Hetherington, *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*, 9.
- 9 Maurice Mangum, “Explaining Political Trust Among African Americans: Examining Demographic, Media, Social Capital, and Social Networks Effects,” *Social Science Journal* 48 (2011): 590.

10 Diana Owen and Jack Dennis, "Trust in Federal Government: The Phenomenon and its Antecedents" in *What Is it About Government that Americans Dislike?*, ed. John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 209-226.

11 Mark J. Hetherington and Thomas J. Rudolph, *Why Washington Won't Work: Polarization, Political Trust, and the Governing Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 4.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Hetherington, "The Political Relevance of Political Trust," 791-808; Marc J. Hetherington, "The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968-96," *American Political Science Review* 93 (1999): 311-326.

15 Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn, 239-256.

16 Amy Fried and Douglas B. Harris, "On Red Capes and Charging Bulls: How and Why Conservative Politicians and Interest Groups Promoted Political Anger" In *What Is it About Government that Americans Dislike?* ed. John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 157-174.

17 Paul S. Herson, *Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington* (Thousand Oaks: CQ Press, 2016), 208.

18 Ibid.

19 Mark J. Hetherington, "The Political Relevance of Political Trust," *American Political Science Review* 92 (1998): 791-808; Luke Keele, "The Authorities Really Do Matter: Party Control and Trust in Government," *Journal of Politics* 67 (2005): 873-886; David C. King, Joseph S. Nye, and Philip Zelikow, *Why People Don't Trust Government* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).

20 Luke Keele, "Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government," *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2007): 242.

21 Jack Citrin and Samantha Luks, "Political Trust Revisited: Deja Vu All Over Again?" in *What Is it About Government that Americans Dislike?*, ed. John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 9-27.

22 Hetherington, "The Political Relevance of Political Trust," 791-808.

23 Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn, 253.

24 Jack Citrin and Samantha Luks, 9-27; Hetherington, "The Political Relevance of Political Trust," 791-808.

25 Luke Keele, "Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government," 241-254.

26 Uslander, "Congressional Polarization and Political Trust," 361-373.

27 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs About How Government Should Work*, 2.

28 Wendy M. Rahn and Thomas J. Rudolph, "A Tale of Political Trust in American Cities," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69 (2005): 530-560.

29 Jack Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," *American Political Science Review* 68 (1974): 973-988; Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970," *American Political Science Review* 68 (1974): 951-972; Wendy M. Rahn and Thomas J. Rudolph, "A Tale of Political Trust in American Cities," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69 (2005): 530-560.

30 Ibid.

31 Hetherington and Rudolph, 1-256.

32 Robert H. Durr, John B. Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht, "Explaining Congressional Approval," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997): 175-207.

33 Jack Citrin and Samantha Luks, 9-27.

34 Ibid., 13.

35 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs About How Government Should Work* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 49.

36 Hetherington and Rudolph, 1-256.

37 Diana C. Mutz and Byron Reeves, "The New Videomalaise: Effects of Televised Incivility on Political Trust," *American Political Science Review* 99 (2005), 1.

38 Hetherington and Rudolph, 1-256.

39 Marc J. Hetherington and Jason A. Husser, "How Trust Matters: The Changing Political Relevance of Political Trust," *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (2012): 312-325.

40 Mutz and Reeves, 1-15.

41 Mutz and Reeves, 1; Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

42 Thomas E. Patterson, *Out of Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

- 43 Mutz and Reeves, 2.
- 44 Hetherington and Rudolph, 55.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Shanto Iyengar and Sean J. Westwood, "Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization," *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (2015): 690-707.
- 47 Marc J. Hetherington, "Why Polarized Trust Matters," *The Forum* 13 (2015): 445-458.
- 48 Hetherington and Rudolph, 27; Mutz and Reeves 1-15.
- 49 Marc J. Hetherington, "Why Polarized Trust Matters," 446.
- 50 Luke Keele, "Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government," 241-254.
- 51 Eric M. Uslaner, "Congressional Polarization and Political Trust," 362.
- 52 Sarah A. Binder, *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
- 53 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs About How Government Should Work*, 1-2.
- 54 Uslaner, "Congressional Polarization and Political Trust," 363.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Hetherington and Rudolph, 265.
- 57 Robert D. Putnam, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 28 (1995): 664-683.
- 58 Eric M. Uslaner and Mitchell Brown, "Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement," *American Politics Research* 33 (2005): 868-894.
- 59 Robert D. Putnam, *Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015).
- 60 Ibid., 236.
- 61 Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn, 239-256.
- 62 Mangum, 589-596.
- 63 Putnam, *Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 1-416.
- 64 John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997): 999-1023.
- 65 Eric M. Uslaner and Mitchell Brown, "Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement," 868-894.
- 66 Andrew Wroe, "Economic Insecurity and Political Trust in the United States," *American Politics Research* (2015): 1-33.
- 67 Ibid.
- 68 Shayla Nunnally, *Trust in Black America: Race, Discrimination, and Politics*, (New York: NYU Press, 2012), 6.
- 69 James M. Avery, "The Sources and Consequences of Political Mistrust among African Americans," *American Politics Research* 34 (2006): 653-682; James M. Avery, "Political Mistrust among African Americans and Support for the Political System," *Political Research Quarterly* 62 (2009):132-145; Mangum, 589-596.
- 70 Mangum, 589-596.
- 71 Avery, "The Sources and Consequences of Political Mistrust among African Americans," 654.
- 72 Ibid.
- 73 Avery, "The Sources and Consequences of Political Mistrust among African Americans," 653-682; Avery, "Political Mistrust among African Americans and Support for the Political System," 132-145; Mangum, 589-596.
- 74 Ibid.
- 75 Rima Wilkes, "We Trust in Government, Just Not in Yours: Race, Partisanship, and Political Trust, 1958-2012," *Social Science Research* 49 (2015): 356-371.
- 76 Brent Simpson, Tucker McGrimmon, and Kyle Irwin, "Are Blacks Really Less Trusting than Whites? Revisiting the Race and Trust Question," *Social Forces* 86 (2007): 525-552.