

Nonviolent Resistance Against Domestic and Foreign Actors: The Example of Tunisia and Timor-Leste

Alyssa N. Young
International Relations
Carroll College
1601 N Benton Ave
Helena, Montana 59625 USA

Faculty Advisors: Dr. Erik Pratt and Dr. Alexander Street

Abstract

A range of factors may affect the success or failure of nonviolent political movements. This study shows whether these factors differ for nonviolent campaigns in intrastate versus interstate conflicts. There has been quite a lot of literature studying the reasons why nonviolence is successful and how it can be more successful than violent resistance; unfortunately, few studies contrast intrastate and interstate nonviolent movements. The research consists of a comparative case study of two countries: Tunisia, which saw an intrastate movement, and Timor-Leste, which saw an interstate movement. Both of these cases were defined as success in nonviolence, and factors deemed necessary for success, including the number of groups represented, loyalty shifts in the security forces, tactical diversity, external state sponsors, international sanctions, and the effects of regime suppression, were identified to determine differences between the cases. External state support played a much more important role in the interstate conflict in Timor-Leste. In addition, Tunisia's security forces played an important role in the success of the movement, though this was not the case for Timor-Leste. These results suggest that the international context may change the effectiveness of nonviolent strategies. Violence is widespread, and understanding how nonviolence can succeed is one of the first steps in establishing more sustainable peace.

Keywords: Nonviolence, Tunisia, Timor-Leste

1. Introduction

Violence has always been present in history. The reasons for why humans continually engage in violence is unknown, but while those in power maintain a use of violence, those with no perceived power have fought with nonviolence all throughout history. Nonviolence is a strategy that has been used in several resistance movements throughout history, some of the most notable including the work of Martin Luther King Jr. and Mohandas Gandhi. This system of defense is known by many names: nonviolent resistance, civilian-based defense, civil resistance, etc. In a nonviolent movement, success is determined in two ways: complete achievement of all stated goals and whether the movement's actions directly led to the fulfilment of those goals.¹

In this paper, I analyze nonviolent movements through a comparative approach in relation to interstate and intrastate conflicts. There are similarities between intrastate nonviolent campaigns and civilian-based defense movements, even though their target of resistance is different, and I will analyze these differences and similarities in a comparative case study, determining which differences are most important. Intrastate conflicts occur within a single state, often with one or more groups either fighting against one another, against the regime in power, or both. Intrastate nonviolent campaigns often arise in moments when the population is being oppressed, as in Arab Spring. This can stem from political, economic, or social oppression. Interstate conflicts occur with two or more states, and it is important to acknowledge what defines a nonviolent movement in an interstate conflict. Any occupation from another state, such

as Nazi Occupation in Denmark and Norway, is considered an interstate conflict.² An occupation is necessary for the use of an interstate nonviolent movement as they are not used offensively.

Using previous literature and research, I ascertain whether certain theories of nonviolent resistance play a more important role in interstate resistance than intrastate resistance, in particular the theories on external state support, security loyalty shifts, regime suppression, tactical diversity, and the number of social institutions represented. I hypothesize that aspects involving external support and security forces play a bigger role in the success of interstate conflicts against foreign actors, due to the presence on the international stage of interstate disputes in contrast to intrastate disputes against domestic actors. Because violence is widespread, understanding how nonviolence can succeed is one of the first steps in establishing a more constant peace.

2. Literature Review

Many cultures and religions promote nonviolence; for example, certain Christian denominations such as Mennonites and Quakers believe that violence is “incompatible with their understanding of Christianity.”³ Nonviolent resistance is also viewed as an ethical and civic responsibility by many; Henry David Thoreau promoted civil disobedience, “the open violation of unjust laws or policies in a nonviolent manner on the grounds of conscience.”⁴ However, nonviolence is most often chosen as a strategy simply because other viable military options may not be feasible.⁵

One might expect that nonviolent resistance would not have much weight against a violent regime, but this is not always the case. Gene Sharp argues that “nonviolent action can operate against opponents able and willing to use violent sanctions, and can counter their violence in such a way that they are thrown politically off balance in a kind of political *jiu-jitsu*.”⁶ In Richard B. Gregg’s example of a person being violently attacked, the attacker is validated when the victim defends themselves with violence. Expecting this response, the attacker’s morale is maintained. However, imagine this same attacker with someone who does not return violent blows but takes the violence while remaining tall and exhibiting courage. This tactic confuses and startles the attacker, forcing him to “lose his moral balance.”⁷ Political jiu-jitsu plays an important role in giving power back to the people.

In a state, the assumption is that the government holds all the power, but this does not always hold true. Gene Sharp discusses two theories of balance of power: pluralistic and monolithic. He states that monolithic power exists when the people rely on the government, but the government does not rely on the people, creating a perception that the government can control citizens by force and restricting people from utilizing any power other than force to make change. Sharp believes this model is not a true view of the relationship between the state and the people.⁸ Conversely, the pluralistic model shows that certain aspects of society give governments political power; these include authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors such as obedience and submission, material resources, and the use of sanctions.⁹ Robert L. Helvey explains that these aspects of power rely on “pillars of support,” or social organizations and institutions that allow the government to operate efficiently and in turn give it power.¹⁰ Most importantly, these aspects rely on obedience and cooperation in order to produce power. Helvey states: “. . . the ruler can only rule with the consent and cooperation of the people.”¹¹ For example, if the general population chooses to go on strike, the government begins to lose authority and human resources, lessening its power. Therefore, the pluralistic model of power shows that force alone cannot keep a government in power; the people must have incentive to cooperate and obey a leader or regime, and if dissent is widespread, power begins to shift.

According to Mark Voegele, civilian-based defense “is a national defense strategy that relies on the civilian members of society to defend their territory, institutions, and collective values without the use of military force.”¹² Civilian-based defense is most often used against occupations and foreign armies, but regardless of conflict type, movements use nonviolence as a tactic in response of violence from an oppressor.¹³ Nonviolence can be directed at various forms of violence including those from the state and those from a non-state actor, such as guerrillas, militias, and mafias.¹⁴ The list of tactics of nonviolence is extensive, including marches, strikes, fasts, sit-ins, sabotage, and issuing literature concerning the resistance, which promote disobedience and noncooperation.¹⁵ Against occupation, nonviolence cannot be used to keep an attacker from invading, though planned demolition of rail lines, highways, or bridges can be used.¹⁶

Michael L. Gross discusses that some movements deliberately provoke a violent response from their opposition in an attempt to “strengthen solidarity among insurgents” and potentially “sully a state’s image at home and abroad.”¹⁷ This poses a serious ethical question of whether nonviolence takes the moral high-ground if it intentionally promotes a violent response. Often, when members of a movement are killed or imprisoned, this does not push people away from the movement but shows the “endurance of hardship” against an oppressive regime and builds unity and morale.¹⁸ Marcel M. Baumann refers to this concept as “pleasing trauma,” using the example of Northern Ireland’s Bloody

Sunday, in regard to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In this context, the deaths of the 14 people killed on Bloody Sunday were portrayed as heroic by the IRA, attempting to provoke feelings of unity to increase recruitment and participation in both armed and unarmed campaigns.¹⁹ However, many scholars argue that because nonviolence always acts as a reaction to violence, movements may encounter violent suppression.²⁰ Schock states: “To dismiss the use of nonviolent action because people are killed is no more logical than dismissing armed resistance for the same reasons.”²¹ For some movements, this may be the expectation. This expectation of violence fits with the theory of political jiu-jitsu as well. Noting Gregg’s example of a fistfight, countering violence with nonviolence acts as a strategy to throw the opponent off balance; because conflicts are merely actions being reciprocated, eventually, an attacker may unconsciously imitate the nonviolent actions of the resistance.²²

An additional form of nonviolence is referred to as self-violence, which involves acts such as self-immolation and hunger strikes. They are often considered nonviolent because they “have always been performed by willing agents,” never to other people, especially those who are unwilling.²³ John Soboslai shows that many Tibetan monks who completed acts of self-immolation saw their own actions as nonviolent, and any violence that may come to others was considered direct opposition to their goal.²⁴ In addition, Baumann states that fasting is “absolutely nonviolent and inflicts no damage on the enemy in physical or material terms.”²⁵ Despite the harm they cause to the individual, these forms of protest are still categorized as nonviolent.

One of the key components to successful nonviolent campaigns and civilian-based defense movements is the strength of a nation or state’s social institutions, or the pillars of support.²⁶ These include the police force and military, civil servants, media, professionals, youth and students, unions, religious organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).²⁷ These organizations must collaborate to create a singular movement, adding numbers and crossing divides of socioeconomic status, gender, age, religion, etc. to strengthen a movement. If there is no interconnectedness in a movement and an individual acts on his or her own, this person must violate social norms of obedience in order to resist.²⁸

Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan’s findings from a 323 case study showed a pattern of nonviolent campaigns attracting larger numbers of participants, more diversified tactics, the ability to create divisions within the opposing regime, and greater likelihood that attempts to suppress the movement will backfire, when compared to violent campaigns.²⁹ Chenoweth and Stephan discuss the importance of external state support in nonviolent movements as well as international sanctions and claim that while these are important aspects of these movements, they are not a key factor in success.³⁰ I argue that this is not the case, especially for interstate cases. International reputation and therefore support, not strictly for the nonviolent movement but also the violent oppression, plays a key role in many movements.

The subject of comparing conflict in interstate and intrastate relationships has not been well explored. Much of the research done explores how domestic instability can be reflected outwards and vice versa. I was unable to find relevant research, showing the differences and similarities of domestic and external conflict without illustrating how they affect one another. Jonathan Wilkenfeld and several others completed multiple studies in the 1960s showing how the domestic “conflict behavior” of states was crucial to their international behavior.³¹ However, this was showing their connection in regard to one another, a different relationship than this study presents. This was a space in research that I had not expected to find when choosing this subject.

3. Research Design and Methodology

In order to determine whether external support and security forces play a more important role in interstate nonviolent movements, I will complete a comparative analysis of two nonviolent movements. The interstate case studied is the Timorese Resistance movement in Timor-Leste, a response to Indonesian occupation in 1988, which was determined to be successful by Chenoweth and Stephan. I will also analyze the Tunisian Revolution during 2010 and 2011 that erupted in the Arab Spring, which I deem a success. I selected these cases because they had differences in geography and time period but maintained the similarity of success. Both cases resulting in campaign success allows a better analysis of the factors of success against different types of oppressors, as we have a foreign actor in Timor-Leste and a domestic actor in Tunisia.

There is a level of subjectivity in defining what constitutes a nonviolent movement or campaign. Chenoweth and Stephan discuss the difficulty in this, but they note that campaigns often have specific names, have beginning and ending points, and have observable goals and objectives to which they will apply diverse tactics to achieve.³² Within these cases, I will analyze the sequence of events for each campaign and conflict, determining what may have caused each campaign to succeed. In my analyses, I will identify factors Chenoweth and Stephan deem necessary for a successful nonviolent movement, including groups represented, security loyalty shifts, tactical diversity, external state

sponsors, international sanctions, and the effects of regime suppression. In the sections below, I will first give background on both cases and complete a combined analysis before my conclusion.

Unfortunately, these analyses do include some limitations. First, a case study does not allow for a statistical test of proportions to see which conflict types have more successful nonviolent movements. Future additions to this comparison could benefit from an empirical study. In addition, Timor-Leste and Tunisia's nonviolent movements share many differences, despite the similarities in them; Timor-Leste's nonviolent movement did exist, in part, with a violent armed movement, while Tunisia's resistance was completely nonviolent. There are also differences in culture and time period, with social media being one of the key factors of the movement in Tunisia, and obviously this technology did not exist within the Timorese movement. However, regardless of these limitations, I was able to control for the differences in these cases by understanding how culture, technology, etc. contributed to each factor. Many of these differences were shown to be strengths of the movements; instead of viewing them objectively as differences, critically analyzing their importance in specific factors helps to control these differences in this research. Understanding the role of the failed violent movement or social media can help us understand why certain factors of success may or may not be relevant.

4. Tunisian Revolution: An Intrastate Case

In December of 2010, a young fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi had his fruit stand confiscated by police in the small town of Sidi Bouzid in central Tunisia. In response, Bouazizi committed an act of self-immolation outside of a local municipal building, sparking an uprising and, ultimately, a revolution in Tunisia that spread across the Arab world.

These events begin with President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali's presidency, resulting from a coup in 1987. His regime sought to improve economic development and modernization in Tunisia by "building physical infrastructure; expanding the educational system; furthering gender equality; expanding the middle class . . . , etc."³³ In addition, the economy had a growth rate of five percent in ten years, but this growth existed mostly in tourism and textile manufacturing, all of which rely on a less skilled workforce.³⁴ Because of this, the unemployment of youth, especially college graduates, was thought to be three times that of the national unemployment rate, which was 14 percent in 2008.³⁵ Bribery mattered more than actual qualifications in the job search.³⁶

In November 2010, Wikileaks released US cables that describe the corruption of Ben Ali's regime and showed that his regime lacked US support.³⁷ While this may not have been a key factor in the escalation of dissent, it is thought that this played a role in the willingness of Tunisians to protest.³⁸ In these cables, ambassador Robert Godec stated that although Ben Ali implemented many important additions to infrastructure and helped grow the economy, "his regime [had] lost touch with the Tunisian people."³⁹ Ben Ali's regime only became more restrictive, resulting in "increased dialogue, bridge-building, and collaboration among . . . opposition forces."⁴⁰ His opposition did not have a place in politics, so they often took part in non-partisan spaces, including "volunteer and human rights organizations, lawyers and judge associations, or local leadership" within local unions.⁴¹ Many lawyers and judges denounced Ben Ali's justice system that seemed only to do the bidding of the regime, and much of southern and central Tunisia suffered from economic inequality, compared to coastal regions, stricken with "severe underdevelopment, high unemployment, poor working conditions and poor infrastructure."⁴²

Tunisia's most prominent labor union and one of the most important actors in this movement, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), had a respected position amongst the Tunisian people, representing everyone in the working class, from all socioeconomic classes.⁴³ UGTT's influence helped the movement to reach people from various industries, in everything from education to postal unions, framing Bouazizi's actions as "a political assassination" from the Ben Ali regime.⁴⁴ People from all across Tunisia began protesting for various reasons, creating a single identity among various groups of different religious, socioeconomic, and geographic backgrounds. After Bouazizi's death on January 4, 2011, the UGTT began reaching out to other unions to begin strikes and demonstrations, resulting in tens of thousands of people protesting. This, combined with social networking and satellite television, helped transition the movement from a labor movement to include "young members of the middle class and the elite," bringing the country together in numbers that could not be countered.⁴⁵ Protests initially demanded better socioeconomic opportunities and conditions but evolved into a demand for the end of Ben Ali's regime.⁴⁶ Facebook helped create a virtual sense of solidarity that bled into a real world movement, and many felt they knew they would not be alone in their opposition before taking part in demonstrations.⁴⁷

Local police sought to repress the movement, killing many people in the process.⁴⁸ However, instead of working to repress the movement, this violence reflected on the regime, reducing it "to its simplest repressive function."⁴⁹ In Egypt and Libya, the military backed the regime, causing the army to be more inclined to suppress the uprisings.⁵⁰

However, in Tunisia, the army has historically been loyal to the republic, not the ruler.⁵¹ Knowing this, Ben Ali had purposefully minimized the size of the army, rely instead on the police, the National Guard, and the Presidential Guard.⁵² By January 10th of 2011, the army had completely denounced the Ben Ali regime, and army officials stopped repression efforts of the movement.⁵³ The army generals instead repressed movements in support of Ben Ali, and at this moment, Ben Ali would have needed civilians “to either not join the demonstrations” or “to mobilize large . . . counterdemonstrations” to minimize the influence of the uprisings and protect his position; neither of these things occurred.⁵⁴ Quickly losing support, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14th, and died in September 2019.⁵⁵ After his exile, the prime minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, took office, although he resigned by the end of February 2011.⁵⁶

5. Timor-Leste: An Interstate View

Timor-Leste lies on a small island in the Indonesian archipelago, just 400 miles north of Australia.⁵⁷ Colonized by Portugal during the 16th century, civil war broke out in 1974 in Timor-Leste between those seeking independence and those who favored integration with Indonesia.⁵⁸ In this same year, Portugal’s dictator was overthrown by a leftist party, putting Portugal in a much weaker position and on a path to decolonization.⁵⁹ Portugal withdrew from Timor-Leste in 1975, with the Timorese declaring independence, but in December of 1975, Indonesia invaded, integrating Timor-Leste as its 27th province in 1976.⁶⁰

After the Portuguese began moving out of Timor-Leste, a major nationalist movement, Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Fretilin), was created and declared an independent Timor-Leste.⁶¹ Fretilin was popular with younger Timorese and middle-level officials and eventually became the most popular party in Timor-Leste.⁶² President Suharto of Indonesia claimed that Fretilin was a communist threat; he worried that an independent East Timor would be “Cuba on the doorstep” and may influence other regions in the archipelago to fight for independence as well.⁶³ An armed wing of Fretilin, the Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Falintil), led conventional armed resistance from 1975 until 1980 when a counterinsurgency campaign all but decimated Falintil’s armed campaign.⁶⁴ This was exacerbated by Indonesia’s “encirclement” strategy which moved Timorese into designated camps, breaking apart Falintil forces and support.⁶⁵

After Falintil’s demise, a former commander of Fretilin organized the Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere (CNRM) which was made up of an Armed Front, a Diplomatic Front, and a Clandestine Front.⁶⁶ The Clandestine Front, originally a support network for the armed movement, became a driving force to the nonviolent resistance, growing from a youth movement to a network of activists.⁶⁷ Tactics included relaying messages between regions and smuggling reports and photographs to human rights organizations in Indonesia and other parts of the world, such as Amnesty International.⁶⁸ In addition, members participated in protests timed to the visits of foreign delegations, sit-ins inside foreign embassies, and international solidarity efforts that promoted Timorese-led nonviolent activism.⁶⁹ For example, in 1988, Pope John Paul II was invited by the Indonesian government to Dili to hold a mass, where thousands attended. Timorese youths began chanting “long live East Timor” and had banners reading “free East Timor.” This was an embarrassment to Indonesia and showed the outside world that a Timorese resistance movement existed.⁷⁰ Afterwards, this became one of the most important tactics, and demonstrations and protests met almost every diplomat or dignitary who visited Timor-Leste.⁷¹ Bringing the resistance into Indonesia proper, the Resistência dos Estudantes de Timor Leste (Renetil), a subset of CNRM, was created by pro-independence Timorese students who studied at university in Indonesia. Renetil had three main strategies: separating Timorese students from Indonesia’s influence; illustrating Indonesia’s violence and oppression; and preparing Timorese students to return and continue their activism in Timor-Leste.⁷²

Suppression tactics at this time from the Indonesians included the use of Timorese intelligence agents and night-time raids on the homes of those suspected of being involved in the resistance.⁷³ However, this experience of repression for many, whether it be detention, torture, or the extrajudicial execution of a friend or family member, only strengthened the desire to resist.⁷⁴ In 1989, the Indonesian general of the counterinsurgency team was replaced by Rudolph Warouw who lessened the brutality of suppression tactics, preferring a “persuasive” approach to the Timorese resistance.⁷⁵

Throughout much of the 1980s, many powerful states, particularly the United States, Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and most of Western Europe, remained indifferent towards the situation in Timor-Leste and turned a blind eye to the conflict.⁷⁶ However, through much of this same time, Portugal was one of the loudest supporters of Timor-Leste’s self-determination within the United Nations, although this support became more reluctant in the early 1980s.⁷⁷

However, its criticism of Indonesia's actions in Timor-Leste grew drastically as the 1980s continued, keeping its case alive in the UN and other international forums.⁷⁸

One of the most important turning points in the occupation that opened the eyes of much of the western world was the massacre in Dili on November 12, 1991. In memorial of an activist who had been killed by pro-Indonesian militias weeks earlier, about 2,000 people, mostly teenagers, marched through Dili to the Santa Cruz cemetery. It is unclear who provoked the attack, but Indonesian forces opened fire into the crowd.⁷⁹ Over 250 marchers were killed, and a British filmmaker brought attention to this tragedy by filming the massacre, and foreign media outlets broadcasted the footage over the coming weeks.⁸⁰ Within just a few weeks, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands ended all aid programs in Indonesia, and in the coming year, Portugal lobbied for the European Community to "take a harder line" with the Timor-Leste conflict.⁸¹ The East Timor Action Network (ETAN), created in the United States just a month after the Dili Massacre, kept pressure on the U.S. government to end its aid of Indonesia, and the U.S. cut off all military funds to Indonesia by the next year.⁸² This transformed the movement into a case for human rights and was able to reach a broader audience than the original armed resistance movement in the early days of occupation.⁸³

From the Dili Massacre, it was still a slow progression toward Timorese independence. The movement continued its tactics, promoting Timorese independence in the international sphere, as we saw when 29 demonstrators performed a sit-in in the U.S. embassy in Jakarta in 1994 during a major summit.⁸⁴ Movements began popping up elsewhere in the world, especially in Australia and Europe, and more attention was brought to Timor-Leste when religious leaders Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta, who voiced strong opposition to Indonesia's brutal tactics, received Nobel Peace Prizes in 1996.⁸⁵ In a final action of unity, the two parties, who engaged in civil war a little more than two decades prior, unified in 1998 to form the Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorese (CNRT).⁸⁶

President Suharto was ousted in May 1998, and in August of 1999, 98.5 percent of registered Timorese voters voted 78.5 percent in favor of independence over autonomy within Indonesia.⁸⁷ This caused another outbreak of violence, with hundreds of civilians being killed by pro-Indonesian militia and soldiers after forcing thousands into the mountains or into West Timor.⁸⁸ A UN peace enforcement force, initially led by Australia, entered to regain peace and control in the region, and after three more years, Timor-Leste became independent in 2002.⁸⁹

Table 1. Similarities and Differences in Factors of Success as Defined in Methodology

	<i>THE TUNISIAN REVOLUTION</i>	<i>TIMORESE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT</i>
<i>Groups Represented</i>	Students Women Unions Professional Groups Lawyers Teachers Secularists Poor	Youth Students Religious Groups Middle-Level Officials
<i>Security Loyalty Shifts</i>	Yes	No
<i>Tactical Diversity</i>	Clear	Clear
<i>External State Support</i>	No	Yes
<i>International Sanctions</i>	No	Yes
<i>Effects of Regime Suppression</i>	Backfire	Backfire

6. Analysis

6.1. Groups Represented

Tunisia's success can mostly be attributed to the ability for almost all pillars of support to come together in rejection of Ben Ali's regime. Despite a variety of socioeconomic, geographic, and religious backgrounds, protesters felt a

sense of unity in their movement. Table 1 above shows the diversity of these groups. This is one of the most important pieces of a movement, tying its pillars of support together to create a singular movement.⁹⁰ Social media allowed the movement to spread widely across Tunisia, making demonstrators feel a sense of security in their numbers, therefore growing the movement even further.⁹¹ The movement organized a number of groups, including women, who previously supported Ben Ali's regime,⁹² unions, professionals, students, and political groups, in order to go on strike and march, throwing Ben Ali's power off balance and limited his ability to persuade the people to back down. The main source of power that he maintained was his security organizations, namely the police, the Presidential Guard, and the National Guard.⁹³ While these organizations remained loyal to him, their repression efforts did not succeed, only illustrating the repressiveness of Ben Ali's regime and strengthening the resistance of the people.

Timor-Leste did not see the organization of social groups that Tunisia experienced, though they were organized under the umbrella of the Clandestine Front. The most vocal groups within the Clandestine Front included youths and students, as the movement grew from a youth movement. Students also played a key role in organizing other movements, in Timor-Leste and in other countries. However, it did not have the number of social organizations as the Tunisia case did.

6.2. Tactical Diversity

Tunisia's movement utilized marches with people from all across Tunisia as well as strikes from a variety of professionals, including teachers and lawyers.⁹⁴ Social media also played an important role in distributing information and uniting the movement virtually to organize in real demonstrations.⁹⁵ The International Crisis Group states in a report that the internet "played a key role" in the movement by accelerating and expanding the spread of information, "by radicalising the population by posting images of the crackdown, by helping coordinate the insurrection, and . . . by facilitation the emergence of new social actors bringing with them their own political culture."⁹⁶ This was a tactic that did not have the ability to be used in the Timor-Leste case, due to the time period, and social media's role in the Tunisia case is arguably one of the most important factors.

The Timorese uses of nonviolent tactics all worked in a variety of ways, many of which promoted Timorese resistance to the international sphere. Each action, from protests timed to the visits of foreign delegations to the smuggling of information to international human rights organizations, all worked towards this single goal, acknowledging that the Timorese required external support if they were to reach their goals. I believe that this sentiment was created with the destruction of Falintil's armed movement. This initially was meant to push the Indonesians out with conventional armed resistance, but when it failed, this left the movement at a loss.

6.3. Effects of Regime Suppression and Security Forces

Fitting with Baumann's analysis of Northern Ireland's Bloody Sunday, as repression from Ben Ali's security forces became harsher, morale rose amongst the protesters, a demonstration of the oppressiveness of the regime.⁹⁷ Despite their low numbers (only about 15,000 soldiers), the change in support of the Tunisian army played an important role in the end of Ben Ali's regime. Just days after they began repressing pro-Ben Ali movements was when he fled the country, ending his regime and allowing Tunisia to take its first steps toward democracy.⁹⁸ Though Ben Ali relied on domestic security organizations to repress the movement, even they had their qualms about the president; according to a government official, the police and other security organizations also had economic problems and few opportunities and had protested for higher wages in the fall of 2010.⁹⁹

Indonesian repression techniques carried incredibly violent characteristics, especially in the beginning. They focused on separating the Timorese from one another to weaken their armed resistance movement, which did in fact succeed. However, as the nonviolent movement grew, the tactics of repression, such as the use of intelligence agents, were modified to increase the impact, taking on a much more psychologically damaging role.¹⁰⁰ They utilized torture and worked to decrease trust amongst the Timorese with paid intelligence agents. These techniques were used to decrease unity amongst the resistance and hopefully dissolve it, making integration easier. However, as with Tunisia and fitting Baumann's analysis, this only strengthened the movement, showing the repressiveness of the Indonesian regime, a characteristic that was illustrated to the world through the backfire in Dili.¹⁰¹ This backfire does not necessarily fit the intent to provoke violence, however, as Gross discusses. Reports from the massacre in Dili differ, with some saying the attack was unprovoked and others saying the Indonesian forces provoked a response.¹⁰² While the result of this massacre aided the movement in Timor-Leste, I do not see it as an act of Gross's backfire.

6.4. External State Support

The relations between Ben Ali's regime and other governments, particularly the United States and France, played a small role in the movement, but their roles were not significant. The U.S. had stake in Tunisia, as it had been a central place in the fight against Al-Qaeda. President Obama eventually gave his support for the movement, and Robert Prince states that the U.S. and others waited until the position of the movement was established before determination whether their support was warranted.¹⁰³

Timor-Leste is an example of a state whose destiny was determined by others for centuries. Chenoweth and Stephan argue that external support and sanctions may be an important factor to consider but, in their research, showed "no general pattern indicating that they are necessary for successful campaign outcomes."¹⁰⁴ However, I think Timor-Leste acts as an exception of this theory, although this does not disprove. Not only did the support of external states end the conflict in 1999, the nonviolent movement used strategies to bring more attention from international actors to the atrocities being committed. In the end, the influence of the United Nations played a key role in ending the occupation in Timor-Leste, but its most influential actors were individual states, such as Portugal and the United States. It could be said, also, that the role of support for Timor-Leste's oppressor, Indonesia, could have played a role in its success or failure. It is important to note that Timor-Leste remained from the view of the world while many Western countries remained, while reluctantly, supportive of Indonesia's role in Timor-Leste. The violent movement did not promote the cause to the international sphere as the nonviolent movement had done, causing supporters to eventually switch to the Timorese cause. Additionally, it is important to discuss Timor-Leste's categorization as a full success. According to Chenoweth and Stephan's definition of success, a movement must reach its goals without outside assistance, but obviously, the Timorese independence movement ultimately received aid from the UN and other countries. However, I do believe that the tactics, in promoting an international response, act as one of the goals of the movement, requiring international support in order to gain independence.

7. Conclusion

Overall, Tunisia and Timor-Leste were similar in the diversity of their tactics and the ability (or lack thereof) of their oppressor to suppress nonviolent movements, but they did have differences in security loyalty shifts, and most notably, in external state support. While the similarities are important, I find the differences more interesting and am interested if they exist in other cases as well. In addition, I think it is important to understand why these cases might fail; a suitable next step would be a comparative case study of two failed nonviolent movements of the same category, analyzing the same similarities and differences.

Thinking about the key differences of these cases (specifically external support and security loyalty shifts), this may show a slight difference in the factors of success for nonviolence against foreign actors. Because there are differences in the characteristics of antiregime and antioccupation movements, there may also be more consistent differences in the tactics necessary to be successful. There is a potential that external support is more important for interstate movements due to their presence on the international stage, and security loyalty shifts may not be as likely or play as important of a role as they tend to do in intrastate movements. However, it is difficult to make this strong of a claim with only two case studies, so more work will need to be done to strengthen this argument.

Within his text on nonviolence, Mohandas Gandhi states that "the greatest and most unimpeachable evidence of the success of this [nonviolent] force is to be found in the fact that, in spite of the wars of the world, it still lives on."¹⁰⁵ Chenoweth and Stephan's study has already shown the successfulness of nonviolent movements to be greater than violent movements. My hope is that this paper will shed light on another aspect of nonviolence, and that it can become a norm in all conflicts, bringing us closer to more sustainable peace.

8. References

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